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ABSTRACT 
  The common understanding of the First Amendment is that its 
purpose is primarily libertarian, serving to protect private citizens’ 
expression from government censorship. In the modern era, however, 
the government’s pervasive presence—especially in the role of funder 
of private activity—has blurred the lines between governmental and 
private speech. Further, the relatively new, increasingly influential 
government speech doctrine—which dictates that the government will 
not be subjected to First Amendment scrutiny when it is engaging in 
communication—has been the Supreme Court’s guidepost of late 
when the Court has been confronted with a case involving expression 
with both private and public elements. 
  The government speech doctrine as currently applied by the Court 
is a relatively blunt instrument, one which does not distinguish 
between different levels of government or the varied purposes of 
government activity. The overwhelming weight of First Amendment 
doctrine, however, suggests that the application of the Free Speech 
Clause should be case-specific, with each type of government 
regulation receiving a level of scrutiny appropriately tailored to the 
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specific type of speech with which it deals and the context in which 
that speech operates. This Note argues that the Court should adopt a 
similarly contextual approach when choosing how and whether to 
apply the government speech doctrine. Specifically, it posits that when 
a government organization is charged with a task that heavily 
implicates the First Amendment rights of private parties—such as arts 
funding—and Congress has purposefully given it a measure of 
independence to allow it to fulfill that role in a neutral manner, the 
Court should afford that organization’s selection activities protection 
under the Free Speech Clause, rather than treating them as 
government speech. This approach would allow independent 
organizations responsible for promoting activities clearly protected by 
the First Amendment—like creative writing, journalism, and the 
visual arts—to defend their merit-based selection decisions against 
partisan political influence, instead of conflating the two levels of 
decisionmaking into one broad category of government speech. 
Though this approach ostensibly goes against the libertarian aims of 
the First Amendment, this Note seeks to demonstrate that giving 
independent-minded government organizations free speech rights on 
an institutional basis actually comports more closely with the theory, 
history, and doctrine of the First Amendment than does the current 
government speech doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
According to Judge Learned Hand, the rationale underlying the 
Free Speech Clause is “that right conclusions are more likely to be 
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of 
authoritative selection.”1 Though this statement accurately explains 
one of the primary theoretical underpinnings of First Amendment 
doctrine, modern society has developed in such a way—particularly 
with the expansion of the federal government and the rise of the 
administrative state—that “authoritative selection” at the hands of 
government officials plays a large role in determining which concepts 
will feature prominently in the metaphorical marketplace of ideas.2 
The state’s right to select certain ideas over others is uncontroversial 
when political actors exercise the right openly in the pursuit of policy 
 
 1. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 
1 (1945). 
 2. For an explanation of the marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment, see 
infra Part I.A. 
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goals, thereby furthering the project of governance.3 The need for 
limitations on the government’s ability to place speech-related 
restrictions on the vast universe of private persons and institutions 
entitled to government aid is also an unremarkable concept, given 
that the First Amendment’s limitation on laws abridging speech 
would be rendered virtually meaningless if Congress were permitted 
to condition federal funding on a recipient’s agreement to refrain 
from speech.4 The government’s promotion of certain ideas or 
messages over others becomes much more controversial, however, 
when the expression inextricably involves both governmental and 
private actors.5 Thus, government-created advertisements subsidized 
by private funds,6 state license plates featuring the logos of 
nongovernmental organizations,7 and monuments donated by private 
groups to be placed in public parks8 have all been the subject of 
 
 3. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (“A government 
entity has the right to speak for itself.” (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 
(2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 
553 (2005) (“[T]he government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”); 
see also Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“To govern, government has to say 
something . . . .”). In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Court provided an 
uncontroversial example of this concept in its seminal government speech decision. See id. at 
194 (“When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other 
countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not constitutionally required to fund a program 
to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 4. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 7:5 
(2010) (“Government is now so large, and governmental affiliation so ubiquitous, that freedom 
of speech would be rendered an empty guarantee if government retained carte blanche to attach 
any restrictions on speech that it pleased based on the receipt of governmental benefits.”). 
 5. For an argument that this type of hybrid speech should be treated as a category distinct 
from both purely public and purely private expression, see Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed 
Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008). 
 6. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562–67 (holding that using funds from an assessment on beef 
producers to pay for generic, government-created advertising credited to “America’s Beef 
Producers”—advertising that many of the beef producers did not approve of—did not compel 
speech in violation of the First Amendment). 
 7. See, e.g., Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867, 870 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
Missouri’s specialty license plate program communicated private speech and thus was required 
to issue plates promoting a “Choose Life” message to avoid pernicious viewpoint 
discrimination); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 857–67 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that Illinois’s decision to exclude all abortion-related content from its specialty license plate 
program was a permissible form of content discrimination and vacating the district court’s 
requirement that the state issue “Choose Life” plates). For an explanation of the multi-circuit 
split resulting from the specialty license plate controversy, see Developments in the Law—State 
Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1296–98 (2010). 
 8. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129, 1138 (holding that Pleasant Grove City, Utah had the 
right under the government speech doctrine to refuse to place a monument donated by the 
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recent First Amendment challenges. The question of the First 
Amendment status of mixed governmental-private speech has far-
ranging implications, but few are so close to the core concerns of the 
Free Speech Clause as when the government funds activities that 
derive much of their worth from their independent status. These 
activities and institutions include public broadcasting, libraries, 
museums, and artistic creation—representing, respectively, the 
government’s roles as journalist, librarian, curator, and patron of the 
arts.9 As then-Solicitor General Seth Waxman acknowledged during 
argument before the Supreme Court, “[T]here is something 
unique . . . about the Government funding of the arts for First 
Amendment purposes.”10 
Despite the complicated attribution questions arising from the 
increasing scope of speech that combines governmental and private 
expression, the Supreme Court has become increasingly dogmatic in 
its insistence that “the Free Speech Clause has no application” when 
the government is “engaging in [its] own expressive conduct.”11 
Difficulty arises, however, due to the increasing blurriness of the line 
between the government’s own speech and a private entity’s speech in 
situations that involve both. In situations when a government agency 
chooses among the works of private actors to determine whom to 
fund, for example, can these funding choices fairly be characterized as 
a “message” the government is communicating? And who is “the 
government” in this context—the broader federal government or the 
individual agency? Though the scope of the speech that could 
potentially remain exempt from First Amendment scrutiny under the 
so-called government speech doctrine is vast, the Court’s 
jurisprudence points toward a tendency to treat “government” as a 
monolithic creature, rather than recognizing the nuances involved in 
intragovernmental interactions.12 
 
church of Summum in a public park, even though it had previously accepted both religious and 
secular monuments donated by a number of other groups). 
 9. See generally Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First 
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998) (discussing the different roles the government plays 
depending upon the norms of the institution with which it is interacting). 
 10. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 
569 (1998) (No. 97-371). 
 11. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131. The concept of “expressive conduct” is further explained 
in Part I, infra. 
 12. In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009), for example, the 
Court refused to accept the theory that a state law prohibiting payroll deductions from funding 
political activities abridged the free speech rights of local government entities that wished to 
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This Note challenges the Court’s expanding conception of what 
constitutes government speech by arguing that First Amendment 
theory, doctrine, and history support the idea that certain government 
entities can be treated like independent First Amendment 
rightsholders instead of being understood to communicate a 
government message. Because the theory behind the government 
speech doctrine centers upon the need to implement policy 
decisions,13 which concededly could not happen were the government 
not able to express policy preferences, certain government-created 
organizations that were never intended to convey the messages of the 
party in power do not fit neatly within the doctrine’s purview. Even in 
its previous First Amendment decisions, the Court has treated 
government organizations that interact with private actors in a way 
that particularly impacts free speech concerns—like public 
broadcasters and universities—differently.14 This Note argues that, to 
support the goals underlying the Free Speech Clause, courts should 
recognize that government entities that are intended to exercise 
apolitical, independent judgment about subjects with which the First 
Amendment is particularly concerned—like education, literature, the 
arts, and journalism—have inherent free speech rights. In other 
words, these organizations should be treated as offering their own 
protected expression, rather than as presenting a government 
viewpoint, which would necessarily be that of the political branches. 
This Note’s argument squarely contradicts the majority view that 
the government, at any level, cannot assert free speech rights.15 
 
remit their employees’ payroll deductions to union political action committees. Id. at 1100–01. 
These nuances implicate questions of federalism, as indicated in Ysursa, as well as separation-
of-powers concerns, especially regarding executive and legislative control over independent 
agencies and corporations. 
 13. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (“If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no 
one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great 
concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of 
government as we know it radically transformed.” (quoting Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12–
13 (1990))); Finley, 524 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is the very 
business of government to favor and disfavor points of view . . . .”). 
 14. See infra Part IV.B. 
 15. See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 3:13 (stating that black-letter law recognizes that 
“[t]he Free Speech Clause does not instill in governmental units themselves any free speech 
rights”). But see generally David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1637 (2006) (arguing that government speech should be protected by the First 
Amendment when “the expressive conduct at issue is constitutive of the public function of the 
entity speaking, so that restricting expression would rob the speaker of a core purpose for which 
it was created”); Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and Free 
Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999) 
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Though arguing against conventional wisdom, it seeks to show that 
theory, doctrine, and history support the possibility of governmental 
First Amendment rights. Further, it aims to present an alternative to 
the Court’s broad-sweeping conception of government speech, which 
is in danger of encompassing more speech than it must to support the 
goal of policy implementation. 
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I offers an overview of 
First Amendment theory and doctrine, demonstrating the underlying 
goals achieved by protecting free speech. Part II discusses the 
government speech doctrine and explains the problems stemming 
from its broadening reach. Part III delves more deeply into the 
unique characteristics of the government organizations upon which 
this Note proposes conferring First Amendment rights. These 
characteristics include their independence from direct political 
oversight, their advancement of core First Amendment goals, and 
their purpose of engaging in speechlike activity—which necessarily 
involves expression of private parties that is unquestionably protected 
by the Free Speech Clause. Finally, Part IV closes with a proposal for 
how courts could implement this idea. The proposed analysis would 
mirror the Court’s previous treatment of broadcast organizations, 
applying a level of intermediate scrutiny. If the agency were engaged 
in speech and the broader federal government were seeking to 
infringe upon its set procedures for decisionmaking, then courts 
should balance the government’s legitimate interests in regulation 
against the value derived from the agency’s independence, thereby 
shielding the agency from inappropriate politicization. This Note 
argues that the proposed approach better supports the greater goals 
underlying the First Amendment. 
I.  FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND DOCTRINE 
A.  Three Theoretical Rationales Underlying Protection of Freedom 
of Speech 
One central issue to address about this Note’s proposed 
protection of a government entity’s right to free speech is whether 
such protection comports with the general purpose of the First 
Amendment. No definitive answer exists as to why the Framers 
 
(pointing out that the First Amendment was originally understood to support the goals of 
federalism and positing that state governments should be able to sue the federal government for 
violations of their free speech rights). 
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included speech as one of the core values enunciated in the Bill of 
Rights, but three theories have gained wide acceptance as jointly 
explaining why this nation values freedom of expression: the 
marketplace of ideas theory, the self-fulfillment theory, and the 
democratic self-governance theory.16 
1. The Marketplace of Ideas Theory.  The marketplace of ideas 
theory is one of the most widely accepted explanations for the 
Constitution’s protection of speech. The theory “assumes that a 
process of robust debate, if uninhibited by governmental interference, 
will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least the best perspectives or 
solutions for societal problems.”17 Its roots are generally recognized in 
the writings of John Milton and John Stuart Mill,18 and its 
establishment as the dominant theory of the First Amendment has 
been traced to Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States:19 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their 
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our 
Constitution.20 
This idea that the Free Speech Clause promotes free competition 
among ideas has informed Supreme Court jurisprudence since the 
time of Justice Holmes, and it continues to perform an important 
function in guiding the Court’s First Amendment opinions.21 
 
 16. See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 2:3 (explaining that “marketplace of ideas,” “human 
dignity and self-fulfillment,” and “democratic self-governance” are the “[t]hree classic free 
speech theories”). 
 17. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 3. 
 18. See id. (“[T]his classic image of competing ideas and robust debate dates back to 
English philosophers John Milton and John Stuart Mill . . . .”); see also SMOLLA, supra note 4, 
§ 2:15 (“The marketplace of ideas justification for freedom of speech is grounded in the 
tradition of Milton and Mill.”). 
 19. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 20. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (“The 
Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic and moral 
judgments about art and literature, can be formed, tested, and expressed.”). 
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2. The Self-Fulfillment Theory.  Unlike the marketplace theory, 
which supposes that the Free Speech Clause primarily serves to 
protect the search for truth via group debate, the self-fulfillment 
theory of the First Amendment conceptualizes the provision’s goal as 
guarding individual expression, regardless of its value, truth, or 
acceptance.22 This theory is grounded in the idea that “freedom to 
speak without restraint provides the speaker with an inner 
satisfaction and realization of self-identity essential to individual 
fulfillment.”23 Under this theory, protection of freedom of expression 
logically flows from the inherent right to freedom of thought.24 Courts 
have drawn a distinction between the absolute protection of thought 
and the more circumscribed First Amendment protection of 
expression, which does not reach nonexpressive actions.25 Though its 
scope is necessarily limited, however, the idea that speech should be 
protected because individual free expression has inherent value also 
guides much Supreme Court jurisprudence in the First Amendment 
realm.26 
3. The Democratic Self-Governance Theory.  The final commonly 
accepted theory underlying constitutional protection of speech states 
that free expression must be protected to allow democratic 
government to function.27 Unlike the marketplace theory, the 
democratic self-governance theory supports the idea that “freedom of 
speech . . . should cover only speech that is related to self-
governance.”28 This concept, devised and championed by philosopher 
 
 22. See SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 2:21 (“[F]ree speech is also an end itself, an end intimately 
intertwined with human autonomy and dignity.”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The right to think is the 
beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the 
beginning of thought.”). 
 25. See SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 2:25 (quoting Doe v. City of Lafayette, 334 F.3d 606, 610 
(7th Cir. 2003), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also id. (“A persuasive 
case can be made that speech is different in kind from most other forms of self-gratification, and 
is therefore deserving of special solicitude.”). Nonexpressive action refers to conduct that, 
because it lacks an expressive element, is unprotected by the Free Speech Clause. 
 26. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(“The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the human 
spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression.”). 
 27. See SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 2:27 (“The relationship of free speech to democracy is well 
entrenched in the American constitutional tradition.”). 
 28. Id. § 2:28 (emphasis omitted). 
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and free speech advocate Alexander Meiklejohn,29 envisions that the 
Free Speech Clause was intended not to create “a dialectical free-for-
all or a truth-seeking process,” but rather to support the “business of 
self-governance.”30 Though it would be difficult to make an argument 
at this point in the Court’s jurisprudence that First Amendment 
protection is limited to political speech, the self-governance theory is 
still influential, and political speech is considered to be at the core of 
the First Amendment’s protections.31 
As this Note argues in Part IV, affording First Amendment rights 
to a limited number of government institutions does not conflict with 
any of these foundational First Amendment theories. In fact, it would 
support these free speech goals to a greater extent than does the 
status quo. 
B.  First Amendment Doctrine and the Problem of Governmental 
Selection of Nongovernmental Speech 
In addition to theory, one must also grasp the current state of 
Supreme Court doctrine to understand why government agencies 
might require free speech protection. Though the aforementioned 
foundational theories apply most naturally to individuals or 
independent groups, the growth of the state and its foray into 
educational and cultural affairs have resulted in situations in which 
individuals cannot feasibly defend their free speech rights. The 
following three examples of this phenomenon are typical of cases 
involving governmental selection of nongovernmental speech. They 
each involve a government entity that must make selections among 
the speech of private speakers due to scarcity of resources, when the 
government’s promotion of a certain private speaker’s message is a 
privilege, rather than a widely available right. As these cases 
demonstrate, scarcity of resources and the right-privilege distinction 
make it difficult for plaintiffs to vindicate their rights under a First 
Amendment theory, resulting in a series of Supreme Court decisions 
maximizing governmental discretion in institutions charged with 
 
 29. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948) (positing that the proper role of the First Amendment is to foster the 
political dialogue necessary for self-governance). 
 30. SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 2:28 (emphasis omitted). 
 31. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“The First Amendment affords the 
broadest protection to . . . political expression . . . .”). 
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choosing, promoting, or distributing private expression protected 
under the First Amendment. 
Thus, the following examples show that the Court has made a 
consistent, pragmatic decision to place its faith in expert agencies’ 
abilities to make apolitical, merit-based decisions about which speech 
to promote, protecting these decisionmakers from being sued by the 
nongovernmental actors whose speech is disfavored. In subsequent 
Parts, this Note argues that because the Court has given such 
deference to those agency decisions, they must be treated as speech to 
preserve the independent characteristics that warrant the Court’s 
deference in the first place. Describing these three decisions serves 
the dual purpose of familiarizing the reader with the Court’s most 
relevant jurisprudence and introducing key First Amendment 
concepts that will be referenced throughout the remainder of this 
Note: public forum analysis, content and viewpoint neutrality, and the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
1. Public Forum Analysis and Arkansas Educational Television 
Commission v. Forbes.  In Arkansas Educational Television 
Commission v. Forbes,32 the Court examined the claim that Ralph 
Forbes, an independent candidate running for a seat in Arkansas’s 
Third Congressional District, had been wrongfully excluded from a 
candidate debate facilitated by the Arkansas Educational Television 
Commission (AETC), a state-funded public broadcaster, in violation 
of his First Amendment rights.33 Forbes’s exclusion was based on the 
AETC’s decision to “limit participation in the debates to the major 
party candidates or any other candidate who had strong popular 
support.”34 Given Forbes’s reputation as a “perennial candidate who 
had sought, without success, a number of elected offices in 
Arkansas,”35 the AETC defended its decision as a “bona fide 
journalistic judgement [sic] that [its] viewers would best be served by 
limiting the debate.”36 After the Eighth Circuit held that the AETC 
had created a public forum by “open[ing] its facilities to a particular 
group—candidates running for the Third District Congressional 
 
 32. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
 33. Id. at 669–71. 
 34. Id. at 670. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 671 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 61) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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seat”37 and found that Forbes’s First Amendment rights had been 
violated, the Supreme Court examined the applicability of forum 
analysis to the case.38 
Forum analysis, in its simplest form, divides government 
property into three main categories: “the traditional public forum, the 
public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic 
forum.”39 Traditional public fora include streets, parks, and other 
locations that “by long tradition . . . have been devoted to assembly 
and debate.”40 In a traditional public forum, “the rights of the State to 
limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed” and are subject to 
strict scrutiny review.41 This same standard of review applies to the 
second category, the designated public forum, in which a state opens 
a forum to the public “even if it was not required to create the forum 
in the first place.”42 Though the state can freely take away the “open 
character” of these fora or limit them to “use by certain groups” or 
“the discussion of certain subjects,”43 exclusion of a “speaker who falls 
within the class to which a designated public forum is made generally 
available . . . is subject to strict scrutiny.”44 The final category, the 
nonpublic forum, is any other government property to which the state 
can restrict access “as long as the restrictions are reasonable 
and . . . not an effort to suppress expression merely because public 
officials oppose the speaker’s view.”45 
Analyzing the facts of Forbes through the public-forum lens, the 
Court determined that the AETC had not created a designated public 
forum, due to the special nature of television broadcasting, as well as 
the fact that access to the debate was “selective” rather than 
“general.”46 Further, the “broad rights of access for outside speakers” 
 
 37. Forbes v. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n, 93 F.3d 497, 504 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 523 
U.S. 666 (1998). 
 38. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 672. 
 39. Id. at 677 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
802 (1985)). 
 40. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 46 n.7. 
 44. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677. 
 45. Id. at 677–78 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788, 800 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 46. See id. at 680 (comparing the AETC’s candidate-by-candidate determinations to 
Cornelius’s agency-by-agency determinations and therefore finding that the AETC’s debate 
“was a nonpublic forum”). 
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required in a designated public forum “would be antithetical . . . to 
the discretion that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to 
fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.”47 Even 
with political speech in play, the Court nonetheless concluded that 
“the debate was a nonpublic forum,” primarily based on the fact that 
the “AETC made candidate-by-candidate determinations as to which 
of the eligible candidates would participate in the debate.”48 Having 
made this determination, the Court held that the exclusion of Forbes 
also had a viewpoint-neutral rational basis: the executive director of 
the AETC cited the lack of public interest in Forbes’s campaign as 
the overriding reason for his exclusion.49 Thus, the Court reversed the 
Eighth Circuit and upheld a public broadcaster’s right to make 
editorial decisions, even those concerning which politicians to include 
in candidate debates.50 
With this decision, the Court demonstrated that it is highly 
unlikely that forum analysis will create a situation in which the 
editorial decision of a government-funded institution with 
characteristics similar to those of the AETC51 will be subject to strict 
scrutiny review.52 This decision also indicates that when making a 
value judgment between providing all First Amendment speakers 
 
 47. Id. at 673. 
 48. Id. at 680. 
 49. See id. at 682 (“It is, in short, beyond dispute that Forbes was excluded not because of 
his viewpoint but because he had generated no appreciable public interest.”). The Court’s 
conclusion is supported by an earlier jury verdict that “Forbes’[s] exclusion was not based on 
objections or opposition to his views.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50. See id. at 683 (“The broadcaster’s decision to exclude Forbes was a reasonable, 
viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion consistent with the First Amendment.”). 
Justice Stevens’s dissent pointed out that the majority did not harmonize this decision with the 
neutrality rules that would have applied to analogous situations involving private broadcasters 
under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18, and 47 U.S.C.). See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 685–
86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the AETC’s decision, whether based on 
“newsworthiness” or “political viability,” did not use preestablished objective criteria required 
by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971). Yet the Court stressed that it did not intend to 
permit public broadcasters to exercise unlimited editorial discretion in the realm of political 
coverage, even within the bounds of viewpoint neutrality. See id. at 675–76 (majority opinion) 
(“The very purpose of [a] debate [is] to allow the candidates to express their views with minimal 
intrusion by the broadcaster.”). 
 51. Part III, infra, argues that a number of government institutions are similar to public 
broadcasting outlets like the AETC. 
 52. Under the tripartite formula for forum analysis, regulations of both traditional public 
fora and limited public fora are subject to strict scrutiny and must be both content- and 
viewpoint-neutral. SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 8:9. Speech regulations in nonpublic fora only 
require a viewpoint-neutral rational basis. Id. § 8:10. 
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access to government-sponsored broadcasters with limited 
resources—assuming the ability of those speakers to express their 
views through alternate venues—and preserving the editorial 
integrity of those institutions, the Court favors the latter.53 
Although this case indicates how courts should, moving forward, 
resolve claims that the government has created a public forum when 
the case involves a subsidy with an editorial character, the Court’s 
unwillingness to find the existence of a traditional or designated 
public forum does not eliminate the requirement that the government 
choose among different actors on a viewpoint-neutral basis.54 It does, 
however, ensure that the state must only articulate a reasonable, 
viewpoint-neutral reason for its editorial choice.55 This Section next 
examines National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley56 to explore 
whether this minimal requirement has any real meaning—in terms of 
providing an upper limit on the government’s power—within the 
context of state subsidies for journalism, libraries, or the arts. 
2. Unconstitutional Vagueness, Viewpoint Neutrality, and 
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley.  Unlike Forbes, in which 
the Court largely accepted the AETC’s claim that its decision to 
exclude Forbes from the debate was not viewpoint-related, Finley 
involved a situation in which the concern about undue government 
influence on arts funding was warranted. The controversy underlying 
this case stemmed from the 1990 amendment to the National 
Foundation of the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965,57 which required 
the chairperson of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to 
implement procedures in which the “general standards of decency 
 
 53. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 681–82 (“Were it faced with the prospect of cacophony, on the 
one hand, and First Amendment liability, on the other, a public television broadcaster might 
choose not to air candidates’ views at all. . . . In this circumstance, a ‘[g]overnment-enforced 
right of access inescapably dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.’” (quoting 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 662, 656 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 54. See id. at 682 (“[N]onpublic forum status ‘does not mean that the government can 
restrict speech in whatever way it likes.’” (quoting Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. 
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 687 (1992))). 
 55. See id. at 677–78 (“The government can restrict access to a nonpublic forum ‘as long as 
the restrictions are reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression merely because 
public officials oppose the speaker’s view.’” (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985))). 
 56. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
 57. National Foundation of the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 951–960 
(2006), amended by Arts, Humanities, and Museums Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, 
tit. III, § 318, 104 Stat. 1958, 1960. 
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and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public” 
would be “tak[en] into consideration” in the awarding of grants.58 
Public outrage over the NEA’s funding of certain controversial 
artists, especially Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano, 
eventually led Congress to reevaluate its oversight of the institution.59 
The final text of the amendment was a much milder alternative to 
other versions, which sought to “eliminat[e] the NEA’s funding or 
substantially constrain[] its grant-making authority.”60 Nevertheless, it 
raised suspicion of political motivations in the selection process and 
was subsequently challenged by four artists whose applications for 
grants were denied following its adoption.61 Both the district court 
and the Ninth Circuit ruled that the provision violated the First 
Amendment on its face because of the overbreadth and vagueness of 
the “decency and respect” language, and because it “violate[d] the 
First Amendment’s prohibition on viewpoint-based restrictions on 
protected speech.”62 
In a decision reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court 
contemplated whether the requirement to consider “decency and 
respect” in arts funding actually promoted—and consequently 
required the NEA to advance—any particular viewpoint.63 The Court 
determined that it did not based on three main factors: that the 
provision merely required “consideration” rather than absolute 
adherence;64 the bipartisan nature of the coalition supporting the 
 
 58. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1). 
 59. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 574–75 (explaining the “public controversy” stemming from 
Mapplethorpe’s exhibit containing “homoerotic photographs that several members of Congress 
condemned as pornographic” and from Serrano’s “Piss Christ, a photograph of a crucifix 
immersed in urine,” both of which were indirectly funded by the NEA). 
 60. Id. at 581. 
 61. Id. at 577. The four artists—Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and Tim Miller—
claimed that the denial of funding was based on their “sexual politics,” and specifically their 
graphic depictions of sexual abuse and homosexuality. Julie Ann Alanga, Note, 1991 
Legislation, Reports and Debates over Federally Funded Art: Arts Community Left with an 
“Indecent” Compromise, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1545, 1545 n.2, 1546 n.4 (1991). 
 62. Finley, 524 U.S. at 578, 579. 
 63. See id. at 580–81 (looking at the plain language and political context of the statute in 
response to “respondents’ assertion that the provision compels the NEA to deny funding on the 
basis of viewpoint discriminatory criteria”). 
 64. See id. (“Section 954(d)(1) adds ‘considerations’ to the grant-making process, it does 
not preclude awards to projects that might be deemed ‘indecent’ or ‘disrespectful,’ nor place 
conditions on grants, or even specify that those factors must be given any particular weight in 
reviewing an application.”). 
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amendment in Congress;65 and that the vagueness of the requirement, 
instead of promoting arbitrary enforcement, allowed for “multiple 
interpretations” and therefore would not automatically “preclude or 
punish the expression of particular views.”66 
The Court also observed that the NEA necessarily had to take 
content into consideration as a consequence of the nature of the 
grantmaking process.67 By confining this discussion to decisions based 
on content, the majority made a tenuous distinction between 
permissible content-based criteria for awarding grants and 
impermissible viewpoint-based criteria, which in practical terms 
allowed the NEA to continue using subjective criteria in its 
grantmaking process. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Scalia 
proclaimed that the provision “unquestionably constitute[d] 
viewpoint discrimination” and expressed doubts over whether any 
meaningful distinction between the two can exist.68 Though 
advocating for the opposite outcome in the case, Justice Souter 
reached the same conclusion in his dissent: “[T]he decency and 
respect provision on its face is quintessentially viewpoint based.”69 
This disagreement among the Justices about the meaning of and 
difference between content and viewpoint discrimination 
demonstrates the difficulty of relying upon a prohibition of viewpoint 
discrimination, subject to review for its reasonableness, as the lone 
check on overextension of government authority in the subsidy 
context. As Professor Robert Post points out, “[i]n . . . settings 
[analogous to the awarding of grants], speech is necessarily and 
routinely constrained on the basis of both its content and its 
viewpoint.”70 Professor Frederick Schauer likewise expresses 
skepticism about the applicability of the content-viewpoint dichotomy 
to the arts-subsidy context, observing that “[t]o support painting but 
not installations might not strike everyone as being about point of 
 
 65. See id. at 582 (“The legislation was a bipartisan proposal introduced as a counterweight 
to amendments aimed at eliminating the NEA’s funding or substantially constraining its grant-
making authority.”). 
 66. See id. at 583 (“[T]he provision does not introduce considerations that, in practice, 
would effectively preclude or punish the expression of particular views.”). 
 67. Id. at 585. 
 68. Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted that “[i]f there is any uncertainty 
on the point, it relates only to the adjective . . . . That is, one might argue that the decency and 
respect factors constitute content discrimination rather than viewpoint discrimination, which 
would render them easier to uphold.” Id. at 593 n.1. 
 69. Id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 70. Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 166 (1996). 
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view, but my strong suspicion is that many contemporary artists 
would disagree.”71 
The difficulty of articulating a constitutionally relevant 
distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination in the 
context of subsidies likely means that, following the formula 
articulated in the majority opinion, courts will afford relief only for 
the most egregious violations under an as-applied challenge. In 
preserving a cause of action under the Free Speech Clause in cases 
like Finley, however, the Court demonstrated its ongoing concern 
with the possibility that an overbearing government could exercise 
excessive control over the funding of speech activities close to the 
core of First Amendment protections. 
3. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine and United States v. 
American Library Ass’n.  According to the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, the state may not “deny a benefit to a person on 
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of 
speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.”72 In United 
States v. American Library Ass’n,73 the Court confronted a 
complicated case dealing with the constitutionality of a congressional 
requirement that any library accepting federal assistance74 to provide 
Internet access to its patrons must adopt “‘a technology protection 
measure . . . that protects against access’ by all persons to ‘visual 
depictions’ that constitute ‘obscen[ity]’ or ‘child pornography,’ and 
that protects against access by minors to ‘visual depictions’ that are 
‘harmful to minors.’”75 The Children’s Internet Protection Act 
(CIPA)76 required a “technology protection measure” that would 
“block[] or filter[] Internet access” to the categories of materials 
described above.77 The district court found CIPA unconstitutional on 
 
 71. Schauer, supra note 9, at 105. 
 72. Id. at 210 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996)) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 74. Federal assistance came in the form of either discounted rates under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.), or grants from the Institute of Museum and Library Sciences 
(IMLS). Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 201. 
 75. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i) (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B)(i), 
(C)(i) (2006)). 
 76. CIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-554, tit. XVII, 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (2000) (codified in scattered 
sections of 20 & 47 U.S.C.). 
 77. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 201 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(1)). 
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its face on the basis that it imposed an unconstitutional condition on 
public library funding.78 
The Supreme Court thus needed to determine whether CIPA 
imposed “an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal 
assistance” on libraries themselves.79 In past cases, the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine had been used to find that it was 
impermissible “for the state to condition tax exemptions, welfare 
benefits, and some forms of non-policy public employment on 
refraining from engaging in otherwise protected speech unrelated to 
the purpose of the governmental program.”80 But Professor Schauer 
notes the difficulty in distinguishing unconstitutional conditions from 
government speech.81 The decreasing success rate of unconstitutional 
conditions claims and the increasing number of cases decided upon 
the ground of the government speech doctrine bolster his 
observation.82 
The Court provided a suitable example of this concept by basing 
its denial of the American Library Association’s unconstitutional 
conditions claim on the government’s ability to “define the limits of 
[a] program” it has funded.83 Without reaching the question of 
whether a public library has First Amendment rights,84 the majority 
upheld the ability of Congress to “insist that these public funds be 
spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.”85 The Court 
did so with the understanding that “[t]o the extent that libraries wish 
 
 78. Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 453 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev’d, 539 
U.S. 194 (2003). The district court did not decide whether the plaintiffs had to demonstrate that 
it was impossible for a library to comply with CIPA without violating the First Amendment to 
succeed in facially invalidating the provision. Id. The court did, however, “assume without 
deciding . . . that a facial challenge to CIPA require[d] plaintiffs to show that any public library 
that complies with CIPA’s conditions [would] necessarily violate the First Amendment” and 
“that CIPA’s constitutionality fail[ed] under this more restrictive test.” Id. Thus, though the 
district court refrained from deciding which test was required, it did determine that CIPA would 
fail the more restrictive test. Id. 
 79. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 210 (plurality opinion). 
 80. Schauer, supra note 9, at 102. 
 81. See id. (“Requiring an employee or contractor to speak the government’s message 
will . . . look like an unconstitutional condition insofar as it conditions employment . . . on 
speaking words with a certain content, but will look like government speech insofar as it 
embodies the government’s prerogative of sending out its own message.”). 
 82. For an explanation of the government speech doctrine, see infra Part II. 
 83. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 211 (plurality opinion) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 
U.S. 173, 194 (1991)). 
 84. See infra Part IV. 
 85. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 212 (plurality opinion) (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 196) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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to offer unfiltered access [to the Internet], they are free to do so 
without federal assistance,” which does not amount to a suppression 
of the speech activity involved in providing Internet access.86 Further, 
the Court explained that “[a] refusal to fund protected activity, 
without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a ‘penalty’ on 
that activity.”87 
Though the plurality did not explicitly characterize the provision 
in question as government speech, it used the language and principles 
associated with the government speech doctrine to justify the ability 
of the government to impose speech-related restrictions that support 
an overriding governmental interest.88 The idea that, in cases 
involving government subsidies, a restriction on speech within the 
context of those subsidies will not violate the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine has led to an increasing tendency of lower courts 
to decide as-applied challenges according to government speech 
principles, characterizing the activity as the government’s own speech, 
and thus not subject to First Amendment protection.89 This expansion 
of the government speech doctrine threatens to diminish the 
independence of smaller government entities by eliminating the 
possibility of a distinction between politically motivated speech 
mandated by the larger federal government and merit-based speech 
propagated by an independent, government-funded entity. 
II.  THE EXPANDING GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
Though the Court might have reached similar results had it relied 
upon the government speech doctrine to resolve the preceding three 
cases, none of them analyzed the actions as speech of the government 
itself. The number of situations in which courts use the “recently 
minted government speech doctrine”90 in free speech cases, however, 
has expanded greatly since American Library Ass’n. Lower courts 
have shown an increased willingness to characterize speech selection 
by the government as government communication through editorial 
decisions, thus freeing the government from the First Amendment 
scrutiny it is subject to when acting as a regulator of speech. This Part 
briefly touches upon the development of the modern government 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 193). 
 88. See id. at 210–14 (adopting the logic of Rust to explain the Court’s holding). 
 89. See infra Part II.C. 
 90. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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speech doctrine; explains why its use in the context of public 
broadcasters, libraries, and arts organizations could be problematic 
for independent entities that, though funded by the government, are 
not created to express the views of the party in power; and 
demonstrates how lower courts have nevertheless drawn upon it 
when dealing with issues involving editorial decisionmaking in arts 
and broadcasting. 
A.  Origins and Tenets of the Government Speech Doctrine 
The idea that one unified government speech doctrine exists is 
somewhat misleading, as the question of what constitutes government 
speech is without clear resolution.91 Despite this fundamental 
definitional ambiguity, however, most scholars recognize the origins 
of the modern government speech doctrine in Rust v. Sullivan,92 a 
controversial decision in which the Court determined that a provision 
requiring doctors who received Title X funding to refrain from 
discussing abortion with patients did not violate the doctors’ First 
Amendment rights.93 This decision rested upon the concept that the 
government may provide funding to support programs “dedicated to 
advanc[ing] certain permissible goals” consistent with state policy 
without affording similar support to other organizations.94 Further, 
the majority distinguished the selective funding decision in Rust from 
an absolute regulation on speech—which would draw stricter scrutiny 
under the Free Speech Clause—because the doctors affected were 
“free . . . to pursue abortion-related activities when they [were] not 
acting under the auspices of the Title X project.”95 
Despite continuing discomfort among scholars about this 
opinion,96 courts have adopted two general principles from Rust when 
 
 91. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government 
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1380–87 (2001) (outlining questions left unanswered by the 
Court’s formulation of the government speech doctrine and presenting eight typologies of 
government speech). 
 92. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 93. Id. at 192–96. 
 94. Id. at 194. The Court illustrated this principle by analogy, noting that “[w]hen Congress 
established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt 
democratic principles . . . it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage 
competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.” Id. 
 95. Id. at 198. 
 96. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech 
When the Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1271–73 (2010) (arguing that 
the Court erred in Rust by failing to engage in a searching inquiry of what message the 
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dealing with government speech cases. First, when a government 
entity is “speak[ing] for itself,” it has the right to “select the views 
that it wants to express,” and “the Free Speech Clause has no 
application.”97 Second, a decision to subsidize private expression will 
likewise be exempt from First Amendment scrutiny if funding is 
distributed “for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled 
message.”98 
This second point must be read in conjunction with the first. 
Courts analyze a government’s choice to subsidize certain messages 
instead of others when not speaking for itself under public forum 
doctrine, as exemplified by the decision in Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of University of Virginia.99 In Rosenberger, the University of 
Virginia’s policy of excluding student “religious activit[ies]” from 
eligibility for funding by the Student Activities Fund (SAF), which 
provided payment to certain groups “related to the educational 
purpose of the University of Virginia,”100 did not constitute 
government speech.101 The Court grounded this decision on its 
determination that “the University [did] not itself speak or subsidize 
transmittal of a message it favor[ed] but instead expend[ed] funds to 
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.”102 Thus, the 
university had created a limited public forum for the expression of 
private speech, which it could not limit based on viewpoint-based 
criteria.103 
 
government sought to communicate); Charlotte H. Taylor, Hate Speech and Government 
Speech, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1115, 1163–64 (2010) (noting that “Rust and Finley were deeply 
unpopular decisions among scholars”). 
 97. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (citation omitted). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (“It does 
not follow . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University does not itself 
speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a 
diversity of views from private speakers.”); see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 
U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (“If the NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of 
subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a different 
case.”). 
 100. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824–25. The University also excluded “philanthropic 
contributions and activities, political activities, activities that would jeopardize the University’s 
tax-exempt status, those which involve payment of honoraria or similar fees, or social 
entertainment or related expenses” from SAF support. Id. at 825. 
 101. Id. at 837. 
 102. Id. at 834. 
 103. See id. at 830 (“The SAF is a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or 
geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable.”). 
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Rosenberger and Rust seem to create the possibility of 
distinguishing between government speech and government subsidy 
of private speech by examining whether the government is 
purposefully espousing a certain message.104 Recent decisions, 
however, suggest that the government speech doctrine applies even in 
situations in which the government has created a message but not 
specifically claimed that message as its own.105 These decisions suggest 
the expansion of the government speech doctrine and create the 
possibility that it may be applied in the speech-selection context. 
B.  Why Analyzing Editorial Decisions of Government Actors as 
Government Speech Is Problematic 
Cases in which government actors make editorial choices in the 
realm of the arts or humanities fall somewhere between the two 
paradigms envisioned by the Rust line of cases and the Rosenberger 
decision. On the one hand, the Forbes Court indicated that, at least in 
the realm of broadcasting decisions, the “exercise[ of] editorial 
discretion in the selection and presentation of . . . programming” is 
“speech activity,” but the Court stopped short of calling it 
government speech, thus distinguishing Forbes from Rust.106 On the 
other hand, though these decisions deal with a situation similar to the 
one in Rosenberger—in which “the State acts against a background 
and tradition of thought . . . that is at the center of our intellectual and 
philosophical tradition”107—unlike in Rosenberger, the Court deemed 
public forum analysis inapposite.108 Up to this point, the Court has 
duly treated the cases examined in this Note as something of a middle 
ground between government speech cases and public forum cases. 
This Section posits that it would be problematic for the government 
to move toward the Rust side in future analyses of cases in which a 
 
 104. See Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1, 22 (2007) (“The key difference between Rust and Rosenberger, then, lay in 
understanding whose message was really at issue. In Rust, the government enlisted private 
actors to deliver a governmental message, whereas in Rosenberger it attempted to discourage 
certain private viewpoints.”). 
 105. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 564–67 (2005) (concluding 
that the government speech doctrine was applicable when analyzing a First Amendment 
challenge to the government’s creation of advertising attributed to “America’s Beef 
Producers”). 
 106. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998). 
 107. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835. 
 108. See, e.g., Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675 (“[P]ublic broadcasting as a general matter does not 
lend itself to scrutiny under the forum doctrine . . . .”). 
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government institution selects among the expressive acts of 
independent actors because the government is not communicating 
any specific message. 
Professor Randall Bezanson has extended Forbes’s logic to argue 
“that government has the power to select speech by others as part of 
its own expressive freedom.”109 This reasoning raises an important 
point of contention: how clear must a governmental message be in 
order to be deemed government speech? Justice Souter has criticized 
recent decisions determined according to the government speech 
doctrine as too tenuously identified as the government’s own opinion 
to be excused from First Amendment analysis.110 Scholars have 
likewise found fault with government speech cases in which the 
governmental nature of the message communicated is not clear, 
primarily based on the idea that political checks on government 
abuses—like voting and protest—cannot function properly if the 
public is not aware of the government’s backing of a certain 
viewpoint.111 These criticisms counsel against characterizing the 
speech-selection judgments of organizations such as libraries, public 
broadcast stations, and arts funding organizations as government 
speech, as they do not clearly advance a particular government 
message and, indeed, would likely be best understood by an observer 
as communicating the message intended by the original speaker—that 
is, the artist, writer, or journalist responsible for the original creative 
act. 
Those who do claim that cases such as Finley constitute 
government speech argue that, though the government did not 
 
 109. Randall P. Bezanson, The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and 
Government Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953, 975 (1998) (positing that the 
Court’s decision in Finley could be explained only if “through the selection system itself and in 
the totality of selected expression, government is pursuing an expressive end, which is to 
persuade and teach people to value art that satisfies certain tastes and standards—and 
necessarily to devalue art that fails those standards”). 
 110. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142 (2009) (Souter, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“To avoid relying on a per se rule to say when speech is 
governmental, the best approach that occurs to me is to ask whether a reasonable and fully 
informed observer would understand the expression to be government speech . . . .”); Johanns, 
544 U.S. at 571–72 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[A] compelled subsidy should not be justifiable by 
speech unless the government must put that speech forward as its own.”). 
 111. See generally Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587 
(2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court has shielded the government’s expression from Free Speech 
Clause scrutiny, identifying political accountability measures like voting and petitioning—rather 
than First Amendment litigation—as the appropriate resource for those displeased with their 
government’s message.”). 
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articulate a specific message like the anti-abortion agenda in Rust, the 
NEA’s “programmatic” selection of certain artworks at the exclusion 
of others could be seen as a communicative act, expressing what the 
government considered to be excellence in art.112 Professor Bezanson 
asserts that selective editorial judgments made by government entities 
like arts organizations, museums, and universities can be considered 
government speech as long as (1) “the purpose served by such 
government speech-selection judgments [is] itself . . . expressive” and 
(2) “government’s expressive activities [do] not displace competing 
speech from the market.”113 Although the claim that the government 
is expressing its views on “excellence” through speech-selection 
judgments is theoretically plausible, it does not account for the fact 
that the judgment of experts, performed independently and shielded 
from political influence, is one of the key characteristics that allows 
these organizations to perform their designated functions.114 Thus, it 
would be strange to equate this exercise of independent judgment 
with any calculated, predetermined message the government intended 
to convey. Though this Note suggests that it would be problematic to 
treat these types of cases as government speech cases, lower courts 
have begun to interpret controversies involving similar fact patterns 
using the government speech doctrine as their determinative 
framework. 
C.  The Government Speech Doctrine and State Editorial Judgment in 
the Circuits 
In the lower courts, the idea that an editorial decision made by a 
government-funded entity is government speech has been used as the 
rationale for exempting the judgments of arts and broadcast 
organizations from First Amendment scrutiny. Because the Court has 
not articulated a precise test to guide the lower courts in determining 
when the government is speaking for itself, 115 the circuits’ use of the 
 
 112. Bezanson, supra note 109, at 978–79. The slippage in Professor Bezanson’s argument 
about who in the government is creating the “programmatic” message—Congress, the 
president, or the NEA—is part of the problem that arises when “government speech” is treated 
as a monolithic entity. This Note seeks to illuminate that issue. 
 113. Id. at 979. 
 114. See infra Part III.A. 
 115. See generally Lilia Lim, Four-Factor Disaster, 83 WASH. L. REV. 569 (2008) (arguing 
that “[w]hile the Supreme Court has explained some of the things government can do when it is 
speaking, it has not clearly explained how to tell whether government is speaking in the first 
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government speech doctrine to analyze these cases is not unexpected. 
Moreover, given that the Court’s practical approach has been to defer 
to the judgment of arts and broadcast organizations when they are 
acting within an acceptable institutional framework and according to 
their articulated goals, the outcome of these cases appears correct. 
The fact that these courts have used the government speech doctrine 
as a way to exempt these organizations from First Amendment 
analysis, however, appears problematic based on the reasoning 
discussed in the previous Section. 
In People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Gittens,116 the 
D.C. Circuit considered whether the District of Columbia 
Commission on the Arts and Humanities (Commission) violated the 
First Amendment rights of the animal-rights-advocacy organization 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) in denying 
PETA’s submission to a public art project, which the organization 
paid to have displayed as part of a sponsorship program.117 The 
Commission “reserve[d] the right of design approval” for works 
submitted by sponsors.118 Pursuant to this stated policy, the 
Commission rejected three sketches—primarily depicting elephants in 
circuses exposed to harsh conditions119—submitted by PETA.120 PETA 
sued, arguing that the Commission had created a designated public 
forum for those participating in the sponsorship program and had 
violated PETA’s First Amendment rights by excluding it from that 
forum.121 
The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that “[a]s a 
speaker, and as a patron of the arts, the government is free to 
communicate some viewpoints while disfavoring others.”122 On the 
one hand, the court’s recitation of doctrine is accurate, given that 
when it speaks, the government is free to communicate some 
 
place,” and advocating for the abandonment of a four-factor test created and applied by certain 
circuits). 
 116. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 117. Id. at 25–26. 
 118. Id. at 26. 
 119. PETA’s rejected designs included “an elephant with a sign tacked to its side stating: 
The CIRCUS is Coming See: Torture Starvation Humiliation All Under the Big Top,” “a sad 
shackled circus elephant with a trainer poking a sharp stick at him,” and “a shackled elephant 
crying” with a sign on it reading “The Circus is coming. See SHACKLES—BULL HOOKS—
LONELINESS. All under the ‘Big Top.’” Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 27. 
 122. Id. at 30. 
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viewpoints at the exclusion of others. On the other hand, the court’s 
equation of the government in its role as a speaker with its role as 
patron of the arts is not supported by existing First Amendment case 
law.123 Further, it did not articulate the reasoning behind the leap from 
the characterization of the selection activity as speech to the 
classification of the speech as a government message. As explained at 
the beginning of this Section, the D.C. Circuit’s decision is reasonable 
given the circumstances. The point here is simply to problematize the 
fact that government speech was the determinative rationale cited in 
taking the Commission’s actions out of the realm of First Amendment 
review. 
A case in which a circuit similarly exempted a government 
entity’s selection decisions from Free Speech Clause scrutiny was 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the University of 
Missouri.124 This decision involved the claim of the Ku Klux Klan 
(KKK) that a university-owned public radio station violated its First 
Amendment rights by denying the KKK’s request to sponsor the 
station.125 In analyzing this claim, the Eighth Circuit began by stating 
“first and foremost” that the station’s “underwriting 
acknowledgments constitute governmental speech on the part of [the 
University of Missouri].”126 The court properly interpreted Forbes in 
concluding that the station’s editorial activities constitute speech. But, 
like the D.C. Circuit in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 
the Eighth Circuit did not explain the analytical leap from the 
university-owned radio station—which the government has clearly 
indicated should not be considered an entity expressing views of the 
state127—engaging in speech activity to the government speaking for 
itself. 
Instead of trying to make these editorial decisions fit into a 
government speech doctrine that does not seem particularly 
 
 123. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 611–12 (1998) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Government would have us liberate government-as-patron from First 
Amendment strictures not by placing it squarely within the categories of government-as-buyer 
or government-as-speaker, but by recognizing a new category by analogy to those accepted 
ones. The analogy is, however, a very poor fit, and this patronage falls embarrassingly on the 
wrong side of the line between government-as-buyer or -speaker and government-as-regulator-
of-private-speech.”). 
 124. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 
2000). 
 125. Id. at 1089–90. 
 126. Id. at 1093. 
 127. See supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text. 
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appropriate for their unique circumstances, this Note proposes that, 
as a complement to giving these organizations the freedom they need 
to operate as the government intends, their speech-selection activity 
should be treated as speech subject to First Amendment protection. 
This characterization would allow courts to shield independent 
agency actors in a situation in which the larger government oversteps 
its bounds and subverts a government agency into a forum for 
expressing political, social, or other viewpoints of the party in power. 
III.  SPECIALIZED FIRST AMENDMENT TREATMENT WHEN THE 
GOVERNMENT ACTS AS “[P]ATRON OF THE [A]RTS, . . .  
[B]ROADCASTER, AND [L]IBRARIAN” 
Scholars have recognized the fundamental difference between 
the government’s role as a regulator and its role as an allocator128—
specifically, as “patron of the arts, . . . broadcaster, and librarian.”129 
As an allocator, the federal government plays an important part in 
supporting and subsidizing the cultural life of the nation through its 
funding of agencies and corporations. It also steps into a realm of 
complicated First Amendment considerations, as the line between 
controlling speech and speaking becomes blurry. Professor Schauer 
has argued that in certain situations, it makes sense to “allow[] First 
Amendment outcomes to turn on the particular characteristics 
of . . . specific institutions.”130 This Part examines why organizations 
such as libraries, arts organizations, and public broadcasting entities 
should be afforded specialized First Amendment status on the basis 
of their institutional characteristics. The three main justifications for 
treating these types of institutions as unique for Free Speech Clause 
purposes are their particular institutional goals and framework, their 
close proximity to the goals of the First Amendment, and the 
resemblance of their independent editorial decisions to speech 
activity. 
 
 128. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 27–29 (1996) (recognizing 
“another sphere of state activity of growing importance in the twentieth century, in which the 
state acts not as a regulator but as an allocator”). 
 129. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
 130. Schauer, supra note 9, at 86. 
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A.  Unique Institutional Characteristics 
To support the goal of promoting excellence in the arts and 
humanities, the federal government has created three federal 
agencies responsible for public broadcasting, arts funding, and 
support and maintenance of libraries and museums: respectively, the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB),131 the NEA, and the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS).132 Though 
government funding in these functional areas is far-reaching and 
includes within its purview many state, local, and nonprofit 
organizations, an examination of these three principal federal 
organizations illustrates the internal framework that makes these 
types of institutions worthy of special consideration under the First 
Amendment. 
One of Congress’s main concerns when creating these 
institutions was the need to maintain their independence. Its 
approach to implementing this goal was, primarily, to create a 
decentralized governing structure for organizations promoting 
development in arts133 and journalism134 as a way to ensure that their 
decisions were made according to the guidance of experts and not the 
influence of outside government actors. The CPB, for example, 
provides a model for congressional protection of the independent 
decisionmaking process of institutional journalists. First, its enabling 
act explicitly states that it is “not . . . an agency or establishment of 
the United States Government.”135 It goes on to require that the 
CPB’s board of directors, appointed by the president, be comprised of 
members of diverse political parties136 and of experts in the relevant 
field.137 The act specifies that the CPB must choose which programs to 
 
 131. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (2006). 
 132. The NEA, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the IMLS are all 
established within the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities. 20 U.S.C. §§ 953, 
9102 (2006). 
 133. See S. Rep. No. 91-879, at 1–2 (1970), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3461, 3462 (noting 
the concern that “legislation to foster support of the arts and humanities could bring about 
establishment of a central federal control of the arts and humanities” and reporting that this 
problem had not arisen in large part due to the “26-member council, which represents a broad 
geographical, cultural, and school cross section of the country”). 
 134. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(a) (“[A] private corporation should be created to facilitate the 
development of public telecommunications and to afford maximum protection from extraneous 
interference and control.”). 
 135. Id. § 396(b). 
 136. Id. § 396(c)(1). 
 137. Id. § 396(c)(2). 
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fund “on the basis of comparative merit” as determined by “panels of 
outside experts.”138 Finally, to further distance the CPB from the final 
product presented to the public, it is not permitted to “own[] or 
operat[e] any television or radio broadcast station,” nor is it able to 
directly “produc[e] programs.”139 In most instances the CPB provides 
funding to stations that are directly owned or primarily supported by 
state or local governments, but these channels are subject to similarly 
strict governing structures.140 
Arts organizations and public libraries have put into place 
similarly restrictive procedural mandates designed to separate these 
types of institutions from political influence. The activities of the 
NEA, for example, are reviewed by the National Council on the Arts 
(Council), a panel composed of eighteen voting members, not 
employed by the government, who are appointed according to their 
demonstrated expertise in the arts and their diversity of 
perspectives.141 The majority in Finley favorably cited the Council and 
the smaller advisory panels that review grant applications as part of 
its rationale behind upholding the NEA’s grantmaking decisions.142 
Public libraries generally have their own stated policies regarding 
the acquisition and removal of books, which tend to comport with the 
values of the American Library Association (ALA), the leading 
nonprofit organization providing guidance on the operation of public 
libraries.143 Both the plurality and the dissent in American Library 
 
 138. Id. § 396(g)(2)(B)(i). 
 139. Id. § 396(g)(3). 
 140. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 761–62 
(1996) (plurality opinion) (explaining that “[p]ublic access channels . . . are normally subject to 
complex supervisory systems of various sorts”). 
 141. 20 U.S.C. § 955(b)(1)(C) (2006). Six members of Congress also sit on the Council, but 
they are not permitted to vote and are selected to represent a diverse cross section of both 
houses and both main political parties. Id. § 955(b)(1)(B). 
 142. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573–75, 580–81 (1998) 
(pointing out the importance of “ensuring the representation of various backgrounds and points 
of view on the advisory panels that analyze grant applications”). 
 143. Compare NYPL’s Mission Statement, N.Y. PUB. LIBRARY, Mission & Priorities, 
http://www.nypl.org/help/about-nypl/mission (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (“The mission of The 
New York Public Library is to inspire lifelong learning, advance knowledge, and strengthen our 
communities.”), with Mission of Priorities, AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/ala/
aboutala/missionhistory/mission/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (“The stated mission is, ‘To 
provide leadership for the development, promotion, and improvement of library and 
information services and the profession of librarianship in order to enhance learning and ensure 
access to information for all.’”). 
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Ass’n point to the ALA’s Library Bill of Rights144 as an example of 
how public libraries’ collection development is governed, and both 
suggest that, due to this stated governance procedure, collection 
development should be afforded deference.145 The aforementioned 
institutions’ federally mandated or independently adopted governing 
procedures afford them the independent status necessary to make 
them institutions deserving special treatment under the First 
Amendment. 
B. Upholding Core Free Speech Values 
As Professor Schauer points out, “the arts, libraries, . . . and the 
institutional press” share “a certain First Amendment aura.”146 These 
organizations, through their shared function of compiling and 
distributing information to the public, are central contributors to the 
First Amendment goal of “affording the public access to discussion, 
debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.”147 Professor 
Owen Fiss places the value of these organizations in their capacity to 
“free art from strict dependence on the market or privately controlled 
wealth” and, by doing so, to “further[] the value that underlies the 
First Amendment: our right and duty to govern ourselves reflectively 
 
 144. AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, LIBRARY BILL OF RIGHTS (1996), available at http://www.ala.org/
ala/issuesadvocacy/intfreedom/librarybill/lbor.pdf. 
 145. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 203–04 (2003) (plurality opinion) 
(citing the ALA’s Library Bill of Rights as a demonstration of a public library’s traditional role); 
id. at 239–41 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing various ALA policies as conflicting with the 
government policy of requiring filtering software to be installed on Internet terminals in public 
libraries). 
 146. Schauer, supra note 9, at 116. Professor Schauer includes “universities” in his list of 
institutions holding a special place in First Amendment jurisprudence. Id. This Note does not 
address universities or other public educators because, though they do share the need to make 
editorial choices with the three types of institutions discussed—for example, in the selection of 
teachers, curriculum, and speakers—there are a number of other factors that make public 
schools and universities unique, and the Court has afforded them an individualized species of 
review based on these factors. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 835 (1995) (“[The] danger [of chilling individual thought and expression] is especially 
real in the University setting, where the State acts against a background and tradition of thought 
and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.”); Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (“[W]e have recognized that the university is a traditional 
sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the 
Government’s ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to 
the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines 
of the First Amendment.”). 
 147. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). 
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and deliberately.”148 Though this is not the only widely recognized 
value underlying the Free Speech Clause,149 it is a central reason why 
these organizations deserve special status under the First 
Amendment. By funding the communication of viewpoints that might 
otherwise be silenced,150 their activities further the public’s “right to 
receive information and ideas.”151 
To demonstrate how these types of agencies help to fulfill this 
goal, it is instructive to revisit the enabling acts of the IMLS, NEA, 
and CPB. These statutes are uniformly concerned with the need to 
educate the public by providing access to a wide variety of viewpoints 
and with conducting targeted outreach to disadvantaged persons and 
communities. For example, the Library Services and Technology 
Act,152 the current enabling statute for the IMLS, charges the 
organization “to facilitate access to resources in all types of libraries 
for the purpose of cultivating an educated and informed citizenry”153 
and mandates that a large percentage of its funds be used for 
“targeting library services to individuals of diverse geographic, 
cultural, and socioeconomic backgrounds, to individuals with 
disabilities, and to individuals with limited functional literacy or 
information skills.”154 In a similar fashion, the enabling statute for the 
NEA, as amended in 1990, describes its purposes in terms of 
“fulfill[ing] its educational mission, achiev[ing] an orderly 
continuation of free society, and provid[ing] models of excellence to 
the American people.”155 This statute, too, has specific provisions 
pointing to the organization’s goal of reaching diverse communities 
and supporting multiple viewpoints.156 Likewise, the Public 
Broadcasting Act of 1967,157 which created the CPB, stated as its aim 
to “encourage the development of programming that involves 
 
 148. FISS, supra note 128, at 48. 
 149. See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
 150. See FISS, supra note 128, at 37 (arguing that the First Amendment interest in promoting 
public debate should include a “qualitative dimension” concerned with “exposing the public to 
diverse and conflicting viewpoints on issues of public importance”). 
 151. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 
564 (1969)). 
 152. Library Services and Technology Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 9101–9176 (2006). 
 153. Id. § 9121(3). 
 154. Id. § 9141(a)(5). 
 155. Id. § 951(11). 
 156. See id. § 951(10) (“It is vital to a democracy to honor and preserve its multicultural 
artistic heritage as well as support new ideas . . . .”). 
 157. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. §§ 390–399 (2006). 
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creative risks and that addresses the needs of unserved and 
underserved audiences.”158 
Because their resources are finite, these organizations must make 
choices about what information to disseminate to the public, and they 
cannot give voice to every minority viewpoint.159 The institutional 
structures discussed in Section A, however, make these organizations 
particularly well suited to engage in important editorial decisions 
consistent with the First Amendment goals discussed in this Note. 
C.  Engaging in Speech Activity 
In addition to the similar goals underlying their creation, these 
institutions are similar in the way they must promote “excellence” by 
making editorial judgments about which stories are worthy of 
coverage, which art works are worth funding, and which books will 
make a positive contribution to a library. These functions, although 
diverse in the subject matter with which they deal, are similar in that 
they require “the freedom to make viewpoint-based choices in the 
selection of speech.”160 Likewise, these organizations’ editorial 
activities involve selection from among the speech of other actors 
rather than the direct creation of content. A salient question, 
therefore, is whether the compilation of the speech of other actors 
can itself be viewed as a type of speech. This Note argues that it can 
be in the particularized contexts discussed herein. 
As discussed in Part I, the Court in Forbes explicitly recognized 
that the act of “exercis[ing] editorial discretion in . . . selection and 
presentation” and “the compilation of the speech of third parties” can 
be viewed as “speech activity” in the broadcast context.161 To come to 
this conclusion, the Forbes majority relied heavily on the unique 
characteristics of broadcasting to justify why a television station’s 
 
 158. Id. § 396(a)(6). 
 159. But see FISS, supra note 128, at 42 (arguing that institutions like the NEA must be 
cautious not to apply their discretion in a way that would “impoverish public debate by 
systematically disfavoring views the public needs for self-governance”). 
 160. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91, at 1440. Professors Bezanson and Buss term this 
activity an exercise of “[e]ditorial judgment” in the context of public broadcasting. Id. But given 
that all of the institutions discussed in this Note undergo the similar task of choosing from 
among the speech of other actors based necessarily, in part, on content- or viewpoint-related 
criteria, this Note uses the term in a broader sense. In an earlier article, Professor Bezanson 
refers to the same types of decisions as “speech selection judgments,” a term this Note also uses 
throughout. Bezanson, supra note 109, at 954. 
 161. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998). 
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editorial decisions should be viewed as speech.162 Thus, instead of 
requiring the “intent to convey a particularized message” typically 
considered when the Court decides whether an activity should be 
considered speech under the First Amendment,163 the majority simply 
stated that the station’s selection decisions should be considered 
speech in order to allow it to fulfill its journalistic role.164 In other 
words, the public broadcasters in Forbes were engaging in speech 
activity because they were acting with the discretion required “to 
fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations” in a 
situation in which viewpoint-based decisionmaking was inevitable and 
public forum analysis was inapposite.165 
One can easily extend the Court’s reasoning behind recognizing 
the editorial decisionmaking in Forbes as speech to organizations that 
engage in similar activities. Just as content-based discrimination is an 
intrinsic part of creating a television or radio broadcast, so too is it 
unavoidable in the awarding of arts grants. In this context, the 
“editorial” activity of the NEA and its affiliates is to review 
competing submissions, with the inevitable result that some artists—
or organizations, given the current limitations on providing individual 
funding to artists—do not receive funding. The Court has conceded 
that “[a]ny content-based considerations that may be taken into 
account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the nature 
of arts funding,”166 and has gone even further to say that “[t]he ‘very 
assumption’ of the NEA is that grants will be awarded according to 
the ‘artistic worth of competing applicants,’ and absolute neutrality is 
simply ‘inconceivable.’”167 
 
 162. Id. at 673–75; see also Schauer, supra note 9, at 91–92 (“[I]n the end it is the 
institutional character of public broadcasting as broadcasting, heightened here by the 
involvement of broadcasting professionals in the very decision under attack, that appears to 
have determined the outcome of [Forbes].”). 
 163. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam); see also Robert Post, 
Essay, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1251 (1995) (explaining 
that the “Spence test” is typically used to determine “whether particular conduct possesses 
sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play” (quoting Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 164. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673–75 (“Were the judiciary to require, and so to define and 
approve, pre-established criteria for access, it would risk implicating the courts in judgments 
that should be left to the exercise of journalistic discretion.”). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585 (1998). 
 167. Id. (quoting Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795–96 (1st Cir. 1976)). 
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Finally, as with the other two categories under examination, the 
Court has stated that “[t]o fulfill their traditional missions, public 
libraries must have broad discretion to decide what material to 
provide to their patrons.”168 Consistent with this discretion, “[p]ublic 
library staffs necessarily consider content in making collection 
decisions.”169 Indeed, the Court has explicitly recognized the 
analogous principles underlying the need for government-sponsored 
broadcasters, arts supporters, and librarians to use content-based 
analysis in making decisions consistent with their statutory 
obligations.170 Therefore, analyzing these types of decisions as similar 
speech activity appears to be consistent with the Court’s 
understanding of the First Amendment status of these institutions. 
The next Part discusses how the independent judgment and 
expressive activity of these types of organizations could allow them to 
be characterized as First Amendment rightsholders. 
IV.  AFFORDING INDEPENDENT AGENCIES FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
This Note suggests that when a government agency compiles the 
independent speech of other First Amendment actors, the agency 
may be engaging in speech activity. This speech activity is separate 
from that of the primary speakers—that is, those who created the 
books or artworks being selected—and it is also different from the 
clearly articulated governmental message typically associated with the 
government speech doctrine. Though finding a meaningful limitation 
on the selection processes of libraries, museums, arts organizations, 
and journalists is demonstrably difficult, this Note suggests a 
somewhat counterintuitive solution: recognizing the First 
Amendment rights of these types of government institutions. This 
Part first addresses the theoretical justification for treating a 
government agency as a First Amendment rightsholder; it then 
explores the procedural safeguards necessary for recognition of this 
right to be protective and encouraging of speech, rather than chilling 
 
 168. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 204 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 169. Id. at 205. 
 170. See id. (“The principles underlying Forbes and Finley also apply to a public library’s 
exercise of judgment in selecting the material it provides to its patrons. Just as forum analysis 
and heightened judicial scrutiny are incompatible with the role of public television stations and 
the role of the NEA, they are also incompatible with the discretion that public libraries must 
have to fulfill their traditional missions.”). 
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and inhibiting. Finally, this Part revisits American Library Ass’n as an 
example of how this Note’s proposed framework could have been 
used to better preserve the free speech interests of public libraries 
without infringing upon their need to exercise editorial judgment in 
collection development activities. 
A.  Government Institutions as First Amendment Rightsholders: A 
Theoretical Framework 
Professors Randall Bezanson and William Buss succinctly pose 
the question this Section proposes to answer: “Why should 
government speech be viewed as a First Amendment right, or 
freedom, rather than a form of government regulation or government 
action entitled to a degree of privilege or immunity from First 
Amendment scrutiny?”171 To address this query, one must first 
consider the actual text of the Free Speech Clause to elucidate 
whether a government institution could be considered a rightsholding 
entity according to the plain language and the historical meaning of 
the text. Second, one must consider what goals the First Amendment 
is trying to achieve. Depending upon the type of government they 
envision, scholars have provided different answers to this question, 
and the manner in which this question is answered has direct bearing 
upon the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. 
1. Supporting a Government Claim to First Amendment 
Protection with Text and History.  The Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment is remarkably simple, considering the complex legal 
questions it has inspired over the years. It simply states that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”172 
Despite the sparse nature of the text, Professor David Fagundes has 
pointed out the significance of the fact that the plain language “does 
not identify any limitations on the identities of the speakers on whom 
[its protections are] bestowed.”173 This “object-neutrality” 
distinguishes the First Amendment from others that grant rights to 
specific persons or entities.174 Though Professor Fagundes’s 
 
 171. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91, at 1452. 
 172. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 173. Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1648. 
 174. See id. (“For example, section one of the Fifteenth Amendment and section two of the 
Fourteenth Amendment grant voting rights and privileges and immunities safeguards, 
respectively, but only to ‘citizens of the United States.’”). 
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observation does not necessitate an understanding of the Free Speech 
Clause as protective of the government’s own speech, it does 
“militate[] against a doctrinal rule that categorically excludes any 
speaker from the ambit of the clause’s protection.”175 
Other scholars have read the plain language of the amendment 
differently, arguing that the First Amendment functions as an explicit 
restraint on government power, making its operation as a protector of 
the government nonsensical.176 This argument relies, however, on the 
dual assumptions that the First Amendment’s primary goal is to 
restrain the government and that “the government” is one entity. 
Based purely on the text of the First Amendment, Professor 
Fagundes’s point about its object neutrality seems to be the more 
persuasive guide to interpreting its plain meaning. Therefore, the 
plain language of the amendment does not appear to provide any 
indication that the government should be excluded from receiving the 
protections promised by the Free Speech Clause. 
The legislative history behind the Bill of Rights and events from 
the early republic support the idea that the Framers purposely 
omitted a specific entity from the First Amendment and that 
government speech rights are not antithetical to the Framers’ 
understanding of the amendment.177 First, the text of the amendment 
was changed from prohibiting abridgement of the right of the people 
to speak to its current object-neutral form.178 The adopted form was 
also enacted in the face of proposals to make the amendment’s 
applicability to individual persons clearer.179 Second, in the early 
republic, political figures such as James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson placed great importance upon the ability of state and local 
governments to promote freedom of expression and to speak out 
against the federal government.180 
 
 175. Id. at 1651. 
 176. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91, at 1501–04 (“If the government can claim to act as 
a First Amendment right holder, the First Amendment loses coherence, for in such situations 
there is nothing for the First Amendment to act on or constrain.”). 
 177. See Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1651–58 (“[T]he available historical evidence does aid 
in understanding the problem at hand, both by shedding some additional light on the object-
neutrality of the First Amendment and by revealing that the framers did possess some 
understanding of government speech and expected such speech to play a significant role in the 
nascent constitutional republic.”). 
 178. Id. at 1652. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1654–58. 
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Professor Fagundes interprets these historical facts as indicating 
the Framers’ intention not to limit the applicability of the Free 
Speech Clause to individuals and their recognition of the need to 
allow at least state and local governments to speak in order to fulfill 
their roles in the federal system.181 Further, his historical analysis 
supports the idea that the original intent of the Framers was not to 
categorically exclude government expression from the ambit of Free 
Speech Clause protection. Though this interpretation addresses 
potential claims that the First Amendment excludes government 
speech on its face, the counterargument does raise important 
concerns about the central aims of the Free Speech Clause—aims that 
must also be considered when interpreting the amendment. 
2. Reconciling First Amendment Goals with the Protection of 
Government Speech.  The commonly held understanding of the Free 
Speech Clause is that it is libertarian in its aims, “operat[ing] to 
protect individual liberty against government oppression.”182 A 
number of scholars, however, have suggested that the amendment 
may have an alternate or complementary purpose, enabling rather 
than limiting in nature. As discussed in Part I, the democratic self-
governance theory posits that the First Amendment is “a mechanism 
for protecting the robustness of public debate [and] for exposing the 
public to diverse and conflicting viewpoints on issues of public 
importance.”183 This understanding of the amendment not only 
eliminates the aforementioned concern about the disconnect between 
protection of state speech and the idea that the Free Speech Clause 
primarily operates to limit state action, but also elevates the 
government speech act to one that could “further[] the Constitution’s 
systemic goal of maintaining a free and open marketplace of ideas.”184 
Professor Fiss takes this theory one step further, arguing that, 
when the state is acting as an allocator, not only does the First 
Amendment require the promotion of increased public debate, but 
 
 181. See id. at 1659 (“[S]ources from the post-revolutionary period suggest not only that the 
framers had some rudimentary notion of government (or at least, state) speech, but also that 
they regarded this speech as central to the constitutional scheme both in terms of substance 
(informing and enriching the system of freedom of expression) and structure (providing an 
additional bulwark of protection against possible federal overreaching).”). 
 182. Id. 
 183. FISS, supra note 128, at 37; see also Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1659–61 (discussing the 
influence of James Harrington on the Framers and explaining his view that the state was “a 
body that could enhance individual rights through democratic participation”). 
 184. Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1662. 
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also that a correlative affirmative duty exists for the state to remain a 
neutral participant by ensuring that disadvantaged viewpoints have 
the opportunity to be heard.185 Professor Fagundes adopts a similar 
principle, which he refers to as the “public rights view,” as the 
underlying rationale behind his argument that protection of 
government speech should sometimes be recognized under the Free 
Speech Clause.186 Under this view, protection for expressive activity of 
the state makes sense when two criteria are fulfilled. First, the state’s 
actions must promote public debate and expose the citizenry to a 
variety of ways of looking at the world.187 Second, the institution 
speaking must be speaking in a way that is central to its intended 
purpose and in which it is particularly well-suited to engage.188 
The problem with advocating for this view of the First 
Amendment is that, although the Supreme Court has expressed ideas 
sympathetic to it at times,189 the dominant view expressed in the 
Court’s jurisprudence is the libertarian interpretation of the Free 
Speech Clause.190 These two views, however, are not necessarily 
 
 185. See FISS, supra note 128, at 27–49 (using the Mapplethorpe controversy to argue that 
supposedly neutral criteria like decency and artistic excellence “should never be employed in a 
way that impairs the robustness of public debate or cuts the public off from unorthodox ideas” 
and must be considered in conjunction with the need to preserve “views the public needs for 
self-governance”). 
 186. Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1672–76. 
 187. See id. (“If we are to determine whether speech merits constitutional protection by 
reference to a substantive rather than a formal conception of expressive freedom—that is, by 
looking at whether the speech at issue tends to ‘facilitate the public debate required for self-
government’—then the speech of government, as much as of individuals or private 
organizations, may further this goal and thereby attain constitutional stature.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 188. See id. at 1676–77 (“[W]here the expressive conduct at issue is so central to the identity 
and purpose of the public entity that to allow it to be overborne by the will of another sovereign 
would undermine the reason for allocating institutional discretion to that speaker in the first 
instance, then constitutional status for that speech may be appropriate.”). 
 189. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–72 (1982) (“If petitioners intended by 
their removal decision to deny respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and 
if this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners’ decision, then petitioners have exercised their 
discretion in violation of the Constitution.” (footnote omitted)); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557, 564 (1969) (“[T]he Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“[T]he State may not, consistently with the 
spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge.”). 
 190. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment protects the press from governmental 
interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government.” (emphasis omitted)); see 
also Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1674 (“Courts have been chary of adopting the public rights 
view, and the pluralist commitment to content-neutrality still retains its centrality in Speech 
Clause jurisprudence.”). 
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diametrically opposed.191 Through institutions engaging in speech 
selection, the government could be understood to be both promoting 
public debate and potentially limiting it, depending on the motivation 
behind the selection judgments and the source of the principles by 
which these judgments are made. In the specific types of institutions 
with which this Note deals, promotion of public discourse is 
inextricably bound up with the character and purposes of the 
agency.192 Therefore, it follows that the public-rights conception of the 
First Amendment—which is essentially the same as Meiklejohn’s 
democratic self-governance conception—is a particularly useful free 
speech framework to consider when dealing with these types of cases. 
Having demonstrated that protection of creative agencies under 
the Free Speech Clause is possible based on the amendment’s text, 
history, and goals, the next step is to discuss how this protection may 
realistically be afforded to have the desired effect of promoting 
democratic discourse through these agencies’ actions. 
B.  A Model for Granting First Amendment Rights to Agencies Acting 
as Broadcaster, Arts Patron, and Librarian 
As this Note has argued, granting First Amendment rights to 
certain government institutions could provide an appropriate analytic 
framework in cases in which the discretion needed to promote the 
democratic exchange of ideas conflicts with the need for protection 
from the overreaching of the larger federal government. Professor 
Fagundes has posited that a principled approach to determining when 
government institutions should be treated as First Amendment 
rightsholders would involve granting these rights only when the 
“expressive conduct at issue is . . . central to the identity and purpose 
of the public entity” and when the speech furthers the goal of 
promoting free democratic exchange.193 Given the difficulty of 
formulating a test for when government action has actually promoted 
free democratic exchange, however, this Note proposes that a more 
workable solution would be to presumptively recognize First 
 
 191. Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1676 (“Government speaks, but its twin capacities to both 
enrich and imperil the system of freedom of expression, along with its coercive authority, make 
it unlike any other speaker. A completely theorized account of the constitutional status of 
government speech must take this duality into account.”). 
 192. See supra Part III.B. 
 193. Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1676–77. 
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Amendment rights for a certain category of institutions.194 The 
institution’s right to engage in speech-selection judgments would then 
be protected as long as the organization were functioning according 
to an appropriate internal regulatory framework, which the 
institution’s experts are better suited to create than the courts. 
Courts’ recognition of a particular category of government 
institutions in which state speech is protected by the First 
Amendment would allow these organizations to turn to a neutral 
arbiter when their discretion is being infringed by an outside state 
actor without forcing them to give up their decisionmaking power by 
becoming an unrestricted forum for expression.195 This Section 
examines the plausibility of such a solution by reviewing precedential 
cases in which the Supreme Court has indicated that certain 
government institutions may have independent rights under the Free 
Speech Clause and considering the procedural framework that must 
be in place to prevent abuses of the system. 
1. Building upon Precedent.  This Note has pointed out that in 
American Library Ass’n, a plurality of the Court left open the 
possibility of granting First Amendment rights to government 
institutions. But in another plurality opinion, the Court went beyond 
allowing for the possibility of granting a government institution First 
Amendment rights to implicitly doing so. In Denver Area Educational 
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC,196 the Court struck down an 
FCC regulation permitting cable operators to prevent transmission of 
offensive programming on public access channels, effectively 
upholding the local public access channels’ right to speak over the 
federal government’s grant of the power of censorship to private 
cable operators.197 Supporting this conclusion was the fact that the 
 
 194. Professor Fagundes explores the possibly of a similar solution, which he refers to as the 
“institutional rights theory.” Id. at 1667–71. He rejects the theory as too vulnerable to 
systematic abuses. See id. at 1670–71 (“[A]n institutional rights approach offers some promise, 
but the risk of abuse it poses makes it inadequate as a sole means of determining when 
government speech merits constitutional status.”). 
 195. But see Bezanson, supra note 109, at 993 (“The responsibility for limiting government 
speech claims cannot be placed on those persons or offices or branches that themselves engage 
in the speech. Nor can an informed public be relied upon to limit government’s speech activities, 
for it is in misinforming the public that the greatest danger of government speech exists. So the 
duty must fall, by necessity, on the judicial branch, which must administer and judge the utility 
of government speech, its accuracy, value, and effect . . . .”). 
 196. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
 197. See id. at 760–66 (plurality opinion) (explaining that the provision must be struck down 
in light of “the risk that the [cable operator’s] veto itself may be mistaken; and its use, or 
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regulation did not appear necessary to achieve the legislative goal of 
protecting children from inappropriate conduct, in light of the 
procedures put in place by the government entity and the 
relationships already existing between the public access channels and 
the local community.198 Another strike against the regulation was that 
it would “greatly increase the risk that certain categories of 
programming (say, borderline offensive programs) [would] not 
appear.”199 Though the plurality never specifically stated that its 
analysis involved a consideration of the public access channels’ 
independent First Amendment rights, its use of a form of 
intermediate scrutiny200 to analyze the government regulation and its 
concern with preserving the public entity’s editorial freedom only 
make sense if the local public broadcaster’s expressive acts—its 
selection of which programs to air—were protected by the Free 
Speech Clause.201 
The Court similarly implied that the speech acts of a public 
broadcaster could be protected in FCC v. League of Women Voters of 
California.202 In this case, a 5–4 majority invalidated a section of the 
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 that forbade public broadcasters 
from expressing editorial opinions on the air.203 Though the Court 
again did not specifically recognize that the First Amendment 
protected public broadcasters’ speech, it characterized the prohibition 
on editorializing as overly broad and a “substantial abridgment of 
important journalistic freedoms which the First Amendment jealously 
protects.”204 Although the stations restricted by the provision in 
question were both publicly and privately owned—thus making it 
possible to justify the decision based upon the free speech rights of 
 
threatened use, could prevent the presentation of programming, that, though borderline, is not 
‘patently offensive’ to its targeted audience”). 
 198. Id. at 766. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 217–18 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (citing Denver as a case in which “circumstances call[ed] for 
heightened, but not ‘strict,’ scrutiny”). 
 201. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91, at 1448–49 (“[T]he result in Denver can be 
explained only in light of the plurality’s full-bodied idea of editorial freedom exercised by the 
local government agencies that controlled the local public channels. In other words, the local 
government was acting as a speaker for purposes of the First Amendment.”). 
 202. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
 203. Id. at 402. 
 204. Id. 
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the private broadcasters and not the state-owned entities205—League 
of Women Voters represents another situation in which the Court has 
flirted with the possibility of granting Free Speech Clause protection 
to the editorial decisions of a government entity. 
As the decisions in Denver and League of Women Voters, as well 
as the dicta in American Library Ass’n, demonstrate, the Supreme 
Court has at times expressed a willingness to treat the expressive 
conduct of certain government institutions as protected by the First 
Amendment.206 The limited contexts in which this right has been 
contemplated—thus far, primarily broadcasting and library 
management—lend support to the idea that Free Speech Clause 
protection for state speech could be restricted on an institution-
specific basis. A second limiting factor on First Amendment 
protection for government agencies’ editorial judgments that these 
cases illustrate is the need for certain institutional safeguards, such as 
clearly stated policies and a transparent decisionmaking process. 
Thus, the second factor that courts should examine when determining 
whether to afford speech acts of government agencies First 
Amendment protection is the soundness of the internal structure of 
the organization and the degree to which the expression conforms to 
its procedural norms. 
2. Mandating Procedural Fairness.  In both Denver and League of 
Women Voters, the Court emphasized the protections provided by the 
structural framework of the public broadcasting organization whose 
speech was at issue.207 Justice Souter’s dissent in American Library 
 
 205. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91, at 1444 (“Because the ban on editorializing in 
[League of Women Voters] applied to privately owned public television as well as publicly 
owned stations, the First Amendment right upheld was that of private companies not in court; it 
was not the right of the in-court public advocate.” (footnote omitted)). 
 206. Other cases demonstrate this same willingness to consider government entities as First 
Amendment rightsholders in similar contexts. For example, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic 
and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), the Court considered whether the government 
infringed upon the free speech rights of a group of law schools that refused to allow military 
recruiters on campus in protest of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. Id. at 51. Without 
differentiating between the public and private schools involved in the protest, the Court 
determined that the schools’ First Amendment rights had not been violated. Id. at 61–65. 
 207. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 761–63 (1996) 
(plurality opinion) (“Whether these locally accountable bodies prescreen programming, 
promulgate rules for the use of public access channels, or are merely available to respond when 
problems arise, the upshot is the same: There is a locally accountable body capable of 
addressing the problem, should it arise, of patently offensive programming broadcast to 
children . . . .”); League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 388–91 (“[T]o the extent that federal 
financial support creates a risk that stations will lose their independence through the bewitching 
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Ass’n, which relied on CIPA’s conflict with internal policies 
promulgated by the ALA in arguing that the provision should be 
overturned, also demonstrated the Court’s interest in these 
institutional safeguards.208 Given courts’ historical deference to 
decisions made by government agencies in accordance with their 
stated purposes, it follows that an agency’s independent status and 
the transparent pursuit of its goals would factor into a court’s analysis 
of whether its speech should be protected under the First 
Amendment. This requirement is similar to the first of Professor 
Fagundes’s proposed criteria, which would take into account “the 
extent to which . . . expression is congruent with the original purpose 
for which it was created; falls within the ambit of its delegated or 
original authority; or represents a subject matter over which the 
speaker possesses distinctive expertise.”209 
A related consideration that would provide additional protection 
for the primary speakers in the speech-selection realm and clarify 
when another sovereign has encroached upon the protected 
expression of a government agency is whether the agency has a stated 
policy regarding its speech-selection methods.210 Formal selection 
policies provide unbiased explanations to individuals whose speech 
was not selected. They also provide a baseline account of selection 
policies created by experts in the field, which can be contrasted with a 
conflicting governmental policy in a First Amendment analysis.211 
Given that most, if not all, of the institutions to which this Note 
proposes extending First Amendment protection already have these 
 
power of governmental largesse, the elaborate structure established by the Public Broadcasting 
Act already operates to insulate local stations from governmental interference.”). 
 208. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 239–41 (2003) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (outlining the openly stated policies of the ALA articulated in the Library Bill of 
Rights, as well as its stance against labeling of books and restricted shelf policies). 
 209. Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1677. 
 210. This idea is adapted from Professor Gia Lee’s article advocating clear speech policies as 
a way to justify judicial deference to state institutions in the face of individual employees’ First 
Amendment claims. See generally Gia B. Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in Government 
Institutions and Programs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1691 (2009) (arguing in favor of a “free speech 
conditional deference model,” which suggests that courts should apply reasonableness review to 
regulations of the speech of government employees only if the government entity’s restriction of 
speech is enforced pursuant to a clearly stated policy). 
 211. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 239–41 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing a comparison 
of the ALA’s stated policies against censorship to the CIPA provision requiring Internet 
filtering software to be installed on library computers and concluding that the CIPA provision is 
not consistent with “the historical development of library practice”). 
